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The idea that the offering of securities should be fair and equitable
to public investors, which has been embodied in state securities laws for
more than half a century, comes under strenuous if not coherent attack in
Professor James S. Mofsky's book. His book is a collection of articles,
some of which have previously been published, relating to different aspects of state blue sky regulation,' including public and private offerings
of securities, registrations and exemptions. This is preceded by a historical background of the state blue sky laws, in which the author glowingly
refers to the financial speculation which characterized the last half of the
nineteenth century, and concludes that had they existed then, these laws
would have jeopardized the economic development of the country.2
There is a clear need for a book which objectively evaluates the
advantages and disadvantages of state blue sky regulation, particularly
its economic effects. This book fails to meet that need because of the
author's limited purpose and evident bias. As he mentions in his preface,
it is only "those disadvantages" of blue sky regulations "which comprise
the subject of this treatise."' Objectivity under this limitation is
impossible.
All of the alleged sins of the state securities laws are lumped into
the concept of paternalistic "merit regulation." Under this concept, according to the author, state securities administrators are required "to examine
the economic risk inherent in a given issue of stock"' and to determine
which securities are "too speculative for public investment." 5 While it
has occasionally been so described by its defenders,' the concept of merit
regulation does not appear in the language of any of the state securities
laws and certainly cannot be inferred from their administration. Many
of the more progressive state laws provide that securities may not be
publicly offered if the administrator determines that the offering would
be "unfair or inequitable" to purchasers or is being made on "unfair
terms."7 The Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted by more
1. State securities laws are frequently referred to as blue sky laws, and the terms
are used interchangeably.
2. M. JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934) contains a good discussion of the
financial manipulations and swindling of the public that prevailed during this unregulated
period.
3. J. MoFsxY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 1 (1971)
thereinafter cited as MOFSKY].
4. Id. at 15.

5.

Id. at 5.

6. See, e.g., Hueni, Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. Rev. 1417 (1969). This contains an excellent analysis of the purpose
and application of the major state registration requirements.
7. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS § 451.706(a) (2) (E) (1967); Mo. REv. STAT. §

409.306(a) (2) (E) (1969).
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than half the states, provides that the offering may not be made if it
would "tend to work a fraud upon purchasers," or if the offering would
involve "unreasonable" underwriters' commissions, promoters' profits, or
options.8 These statutory tests, which have been similarly interpreted, do
not authorize an administrator to deny an offering of securities merely
because they are too speculative. Moreover, thousands of speculative
securities issues have been registered for public offering since the inception of the state blue sky laws.
The real purpose of state securities laws is to prevent promoters, insiders and controlling persons from taking undue advantage of public
investors. This purpose is inherent in the statutory language. It is also
apparent from the registration policies enunciated by the state administrators pursuant to their statutory mandate; these policies impose
limitations on the amount of options that may be granted to promoters
and insiders, the amount of "cheap stock" that may be purchased by
promoters below the public offering price and the minimum tangible
investment required by promoters of a new enterprise9 but in no way
limit the kind of securities that may be offered to the public. These
policies are designed to accomplish an equitable sharing between the
promoters and the public in the economic risk of companies whose
securities are being sold in the public market place. If securities offerings
of speculative new ventures run afoul of state registration requirements
more frequently than offerings of more seasoned companies, it is because
their promoters and insiders too often propose that they reap most of the
benefits through cheap stock and low priced options if the enterprise is
successful, while the public is asked to absorb virtually all of the risk of
loss.
Mofsky's book is written from the viewpoint of the promoter, as its
title indicates. The keystone of his argument is the hypothetical case history of the difficulties encountered by an entrepreneur, Mr. E, with the
blue sky law of his home state in attempting to finance a new business
which proposes to manufacture, naturally enough, promotional products.
Mr. E first attempts a limited private offering exempt from registration
but is unsuccessful in persuading a group of financially sophisticated
persons to contribute 98 per cent of the equity capital of the business in
exchange for only 49 per cent of the stock.1" Mr. E then attempts a
8. UN FoRM ScuRiTiEs AcT §§ 306 (a) (2) (E), (F). Cf. IND. CODE §§ 23-2-1-7
(a) (2) (E), (H) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 25-861(a) (2) (E), (H) (1970).
9. See Statements of Policy of Midwest Securities Commissioners Ass'n on Cheap
Stock, Promoters' Investment and Options and Warrants, BLuE Sxc L. RE'. 1114,761,
4,771, 4,796.
10. MoFsKY, supra note 3, at 47.
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registered public offering, but finds that the rules of the Florida Securities
Division permit him to retain only 27 per cent of the outstanding stock
for his two per cent capital contribution to the business." Mofsky argues
that these blue sky restrictions, which prevent Mr. E from controlling his
company even though he has invested virtually nothing in it, are bad for
the economy since marginal new ventures of this kind will not proceed
with their stock offerings. While the blue sky restrictions on the stock
offerings which 'Mofsky describes certainly exist, the case history does not
demonstrate that they are unreasonable, and it is difficult to develop much
sympathy for Mr. E's problem.
The state securities laws unquestionably lodge a considerable
amount of discretion in their respective administrators. After the constitutionality of these laws was affirmed in 1917 in the Blue Sky Cases 2
by a nearly unanimous Supreme Court that was not noted for sustaining
progressive legislation, the manner in which this broad discretion has
been exercised by the administrators has seldom been challenged. This
is regrettable, since it tends to encourage arbitrary decisions based on
informal unwritten rules. This is not, however, the fault of the laws or
even of the administrators, but of securities issuers over the years who
failed to appeal from decisions of administrators who overstepped their
statutory authority. The broad, fair and equitable philosophy of the state
securities laws has been criticized by those, including Mofsky, who prefer
the full disclosure philosophy written into the federal securities laws.'"
But the statutory mandate of the state blue sky laws is no more arbitrary
or discretionary than that in the regulation of public utilities, for example,
where state public utility commissions are directed to determine "fair
and reasonable rates."
Since Mofsky incorrectly concludes that the basis upon which state
blue sky laws were enacted was merely to prevent fraud in the promotion
of new corporate ventures,14 it is not surprising that he calls for "meaningful reform" of these laws, based on an economic analysis of the
11.

Id. at 50.

12. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) ; Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) ; Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
These cases sustained the blue sky laws of Ohio, South Dakota and Michigan.
13. MoFsxY, supra note 3, at 10. Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 states
that nothing therein "shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of
any State or Territory . . . over any security or any person." 15 U.S.C. § 77 r (1970).
Congress thus decided against federal pre-emption of the state securities laws.
14. Professor Mofsky has an annoying tendency of not citing any authorities for
his more controversial assertions and of using his footnotes merely to amplify his text,
as in this example.
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relative costs and benefits of blue sky regulation."5 Such an analysis
would surely be desirable, but Mofsky is not willing to wait for it, and
summarily concludes that the "emphasis of the state regulation should be
strong anti-fraud enforcement rather than merit regulation."' 1 He also
states that reform is unlikely to be sponsored by legislators, investment
bankers, blue sky lawyers or the administrators themselves. One wonders
from where he expects reform to come. He criticizes those states which
"felt free to apply their personal handiwork"' 7 in revising the Uniform
Act for adoption in their own jurisdictions, thereby making it less
uniform, without even mentioning the serious weaknesses in the Act
which prompted those revisions.'
Mofsky also dismisses the securities law revisions, designed to
reflect modern conditions in securities markets, recently completed in
California and Wisconsin."9 He argues that the resulting laws were
"complex, severely regulatory, and highly discretionary,"2 presumably
because they retained the fair and equitable philosophy. Structural revision of a state securities law is far different from revision of its underlying philosophy, and Mofsky's dismay at the failure to consider the latter
should not have led him to ignore the benefits achieved by the former.
Before any radical change is made in the underlying philosophy of the
state blue sky laws, which have stood the test of time, the burden of proof
rests with the proponents of change.
Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions contains much
worthwhile factual information for a person desiring to become acquainted with the state securities laws. There is a good discussion of state
registration requirements and policies, including a flavor of the informality that prevails in many of the states. The private offering exemption
from registration is well described, including the anachronistic limitations
on this exemption in the older state laws. More than a third of the book
is devoted to appendices of comparative state provisions dealing with
exempt securities, exempt transactions and types of registration," which
15.

MOFSKY, supra note 3, at 86.

16. Id. at 75.
17. Id. at 73.
18. The Act's more glaring weaknesses include its failure to include a civil remedy
for defrauded sellers of securities, its exclusion of corporate mergers and sales of assets
from the definition of "sale" (thereby also excluding them from the anti-fraud provisions) and its exemption from registration of secondary distributions by controlling
persons of issuers listed in recognized securities manuals. Cf. UmroR SECUmTmS Acr
§§ 401(j) (6) (C), 402(b) (2), 410(a) (2).

19.
(1969).
20.

CAL.

CORP. CODE

§ 25000 et seq. (West 1955); Wis.

MoFsKY, supra note 3, at 82.

21. Id. at 99-168.

STAT.

§ 551.01 et seq.
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may be useful to some, although they are well covered in the loose leaf
services. It is regrettable that the worthwhile information is so intertwined
with the author's imperfect analysis and questionable judgments.
THOMAs NELSONt
t Commissioner of Securities, State of Wisconsin.

It was a former SEC commissioner who, when describing the
activities of his commission, remarked, "We can see that the dice aren't
loaded, but we can't save a fool from his folly." In essence, the remark
underscores the difference between the philosophy underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and that of most state blue sky laws. The 1933 Act,
aside from its fraud prohibitions, ostensibly is concerned only with full
and fair disclosure; the prospective investor is free to make his own
judgment whether or not to buy. Conversely, the preponderance of state
securities regulation is merit regulation which is concerned with saving a
fool from his folly. Professor Mofsky's book contains a critical and
refreshing analysis of the body of blue sky law with which new business
has had to deal in the past and must deal with today.
Most regulators will not like this book. It represents an indictment,
not only of the so-called standards contained in the laws, but of the
manner in which those laws are administered and the standards applied.
Professor Mofsky calls for an economic cost-benefit analysis of this
regulatory area, as opposed to blithe acceptance on a face value basis. If,
he proposes, such an analysis demonstrates to competent economists that
the costs of merit regulation exceed its benefits, serious consideration
should be given to its abolition. In that event, he would not have blue sky
laws attempt to save a fool from his folly. In short, he would shelve the
merit regulation approach altogether, on the ground that its net costs
to society are too dear. This is another way of saying that people should be
able to buy the securities they want to buy. Further, new business should
be able to sell the securities it wants to sell. If in the offer or sale a lie
gets by, if there is fraud or deceit, then is the time to regulate and
punish. The emphasis in state securities regulation should be placed on
strengthening of fraud enforcement rather than on what he considers
undue restriction of new business enterprises.
If the suggested analytical study does reveal that the merit regulation game is worth the candle, the author argues forcibly that existing
laws and standards should be applied on a consistent rather than on an

